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I. INTRODUCTION
In the later part of his administration, President Reagan appointed a blue
ribbon commission on defense management, chaired by Mr. David Packard. In 1986
this commission published its final report to the President. The work was called A
Quest fo r Excellence and was an all inclusive examination of four aspects of the
Department of the Defense: national security planning and budgeting, military
organization and command, acquisition organization and procedures, and govemmentmdustry accountability. After the recommendations of the report were published,
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 219, issued by President Reagan,
directed their implementation. This directive was enacted into law by the passage of
the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 (Public Law 433, 1986).
The Packard Conunission report had a section that addressed acquisition
organizations and procedures called "An Acquisition Model to Emulate. " The basis of
the model that "...major savings are possible in the development of weapon systems if
Department of Defense broadly emulates the acquisition procedures used in
outstanding programs. To this end, (the Commission) analyzed a number of
successful programs to identify management features that they had in common, and
could be incorporated in the defense system. (The Commission) identified six
underlying features that typified the most successful commercial programs: ’clear
command channels’, ’stability’, ’limited reporting requirements’, ’small, high quality
staffs’, ’communication with users’, and ’prototyping and testing’." (Packard
Commission, 1986).

1
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The purpose of this paper is not to measure the implementation of this model,
but to determine if these measures are evident in existing programs which are
considered to be successful. To observe the extent that the characteristics of the
model are present in existing programs, a survey was sent to two separate Army
aviation acquisition programs. The programs selected were the CH-47 Cargo
Helicopter D model upgrade and the Special Operating Forces (SOP) aircraft upgrade
for the CH-47 aircraft. These acquisitions were selected because both are relatively
recent and are of the same basic aircraft type. To determine if a program was
"successful", a subjective analysis was done using performance measures. The
measures by which each of the procurements were Judged were cost effectiveness and
the timeliness of the acquisition.
Historically, the press has reported stories of fraud, kickbacks, payoffs, and
other types of misuse of government funds in defense acquisitions. This enigma in
defense contracting has cost the tax payers countless dollars. This problem is not new
and has roots prior to contemporary weapon systems. Before World War I, contracts
and major weapons acquisitions were localized and generally the same local
contractors were used. Bidding was not effective and competition was practically non
existent. In the World War II era, the concept of government procurement was one of
"damn the costs, there is a war going on". This brought into existence a contract
known as Cost Plus. Under this agreement, defense contractors submitted a bill to the
government and charged a percentage of the costs for their profit fee. This contract
did not lend itself to an efficient use of funds, and did not guarantee that the end
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product would be anywhere near what was promised. These profit percentages,
although criticized by Congress, were the beginning of the continued criticism of
defense procurement. This "goldplating" of military hardware by cost plus contracts
disappeared after World War II, but the emphasis on material first and cost second
persisted through most of the Cold War era.
During the Kennedy administration, defense contracting reforms were
instituted. In what is considered a watershed case, Lockheed in 1961, bid not only
for the research and development of a new generation of transport planes (C-5A cargo
aircraft) and engines, but also for the actual production of the aircraft. Previously,
contractors bid for development only and production lots were bid for later. This new
system arose when attempts were being made to find new types of contracts that
would tie profits to cost controls.
This system did not work as anticipated. Lockheed managed to run up a multi
billion dollar cost overrun on the project and it was during this procurement that the
term "whistle blower" was coined.

Cost overruns occurred because no one could

accurately estimate what the cost would be or should be before the program was
developed. It was at this point that the confidence of Congress and the public in
military procurement management was lost (Gregory, 1990).
After this failure, the military tried to award contracts with a "fly before you
buy" concept (Gregory, 1990). This allowed the military to ascertain if the weapon
system would perform as advertised. If there was a problem with the scheduling or
performance requirements, adjustments could be made before new funds were
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allocated to the project.
During Reagan’s administration, defense buildups and restructuring coupled
with double digit inflation caused more strain on the already faltering relations
between Congress and the Department of the Defense contracting community. Spare
parts started to make the headlines with seemingly unreasonably prices attached to
them. Even though some of the pricing was "justified" through creative accounting by
using spare parts for the redistribution of overhead and engineering support costs, it
was difficult to explain the problem away to the public and Congress. It was during
the later part of his administration that President Reagan appointed the Packard
Commission to investigate the problems in the defense industry.
In an era of a smaller, more efficient military structure, the dollars that will be
made available for major systems will decrease. This downsizing has already had
immediate impact on future acquisitions as well as the current programs. Almost all
Department of Defense projects are being affected in some way. The B-1 Bomber,
Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATP), and the nuclear submarine projects are being
threatened with reduction or cancellation. This suggests that the managers of the
acquisitions dollars must be more cognizant of where the funds are going and if they
are being put to their best and most efficient use.
This paper begins with a brief description of the CH-47 aircraft, followed by
an evaluation of the CH-47 D model upgrade program and the SOF aircraft
modification program. The next sections will cover the survey and the results. The
last segment will provide a summary and a conclusion.
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II.

DESCRIPTION OF THE CH-47 AIRCRAFT

The CH-47 (Cargo Helicopter) medium lift helicopter was designed and
developed by the Boeing Helicopter Company in the late 1950’s. The contract was a
result from a design competition conducted by the Air Force on behalf of the Army.
A total of 699 helicopters were delivered, with the airframe being a combat tested
performer throughout the Vietnam conflict. The CH-47 has undergone several
modifications throughout it’s production life, from the A model to the current D
model. Each model, while retaining the basic airframe structure, has a different
mission capability and Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM)
characteristics. For the purposes of this paper the CH-47 C model aircraft will be
described as a baseline to compare to the current modifications.
The CH-47C helicopter is the Army’s only tandem rotor, medium lift transport
helicopter (fig 1). It’s primary missions are the movement of munitions, repair parts,
petroleum, tactical artillery, troops and special weapons around the battlefield.
Additional missions include high altitude search and rescue, fire fighting and special
operations. The "Chinook" helicopter is currently deployed around the world and is
used by fifteen separate nations (Boeing, 1989).

SPECIFICATIONS:
Max gross weight: 47,000 lbs.. Empty Weight: 23,149 lbs.. Length: 51 ft., Height:
18 ft. 7.8 in.. Fuel: 1,030 U.S. gallons.
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Figure 1.

CH-47 Cargo Helicopter.

PERFORMANCE (at gross weight):
Maximum speed (sea level): 142 knots, Service ceiling: 8,500 ft.. Maximum range:
229 nm., Rate of climb: 1,100 fpm.. Lift capacity: 23,851 lbs. (Headquarters,
Department of the Army, 1988).

A cquisition History:
In April 1963, the first operational unit was equipped with CH-47 A models.
CH-47 A ’s were deployed to the Republic of Vietnam in July of 1965. In response to
an urgent requirement developed by the Army in Vietnam, the Army Material
Command formulated a two step program to improve the capacity, speed, and
endurance of the A model. In addition to the performance requirements.
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modifications were incorporated to improve the flying qualities to allow full utilization
of the e?q)anded performance capabilities and to improve reliability, availability, and
maintainability (RAM).
The first step in the improvement program resulted in the CH-47 B model, first
delivered in May of 1967. It was identical in size and appearance of the A model,
with the exception of larger rotor blades. The flight performance was increased due
to the installation of larger, more advanced engines and the advanced design rotor
blades.
The CH-47 C model was the third generation aircraft to evolve from the
improvement program. The size and appearance did not change appreciably, but the
C model was powered by new engines and a new drive train that was qualified for
over 6000 shaft horsepower. The fuel capacity was increased to 1129 U.S. gallons
for the extended range and endurance required by tactical missions.
In 1973, it was realized that the CH-47 fleet was tending towards obsolescence
with no budgeted research and development dollars for a replacement aircraft. The
Commandant of the Aviation School request for funding in the 1975 budget included a
replacement medium lift helicopter. A revised operational capability for modernizing
the CH-47 fleet was prepared and subsequently approved by the Army in October,
1974 (U.S. Army DARCOM, 1985). This was the beginning of the developmental
process for the D model currently under production.
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III.

ACQUISITION PROGRAM EVALUATIONS

CH-47 D M odel Upgrade:
The CH-47 D model upgrade was a natural extension of the past upgrades to
the airframe. It was decided that a rebuild of the aircraft would be more cost
effective than the development of a new aircraft that would take over the operational
mission of the CH-47. The mission capabilities of the D model were greatly
improved over that of
the earlier models of
the Chinook (figure 2).
12
The helicopters were
stripped of all components
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O a
A

and refitted from the basic
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airframe up. Boeing
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system along with new
fiberglass rotor blades.
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Figure 2. The CH-47 modernization effort
did make
the earlier models of the
Chinook more reliable, less costly to
maintain, and much more capable.

There were improvements
in the communications, navigation and flight control systems. In essence, the D
model was a new aircraft.
The method used in this acquisition was called a Multi-year procurement. This
is a unique method of acquiring up to five years requirements of a system with a
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single contract. This is a departure from the normal way the Department of Defense
acquires major systems. Usually the contract is let for a single year’s requirement.
Generally, the multi-year contract produces two direct benefits. First, it generates a
cost savings because of less variability in the future budget. Secondly, it promotes
stability in the requirement, funding, and the design.
The CH-47 D model acquisition seems to be a success story as far as defense
contracting is concerned. Since the process began in 1976, the contract has been
ahead of schedule and has been within the budget. Boeing did well enough with the
production to earn $3.5 million in design to cost incentive fee awards. During the
engineering development phase, Boeing received a superior performance rating and 98
percent of the total amount of the incentive fees available (Sutton, 1982).
Cost savings on the program were substantial, especially in light of the
historical cost overruns of defense procurements. The Army estimates that in the CH47 D model program, it has by 1989 had a cost savings of $47.9 million, or 8.3%
over the total contract costs of $532.1 million (GAO, 1987).
The release of the aircraft from the plant has been consistently on time or
ahead of schedule. Boeing had a 40 month schedule but required its functional
departments to maintain a 36 month timetable, accelerated that schedule and as a
result, turned out the first prototype that flew four months ahead of the original
schedule (Sutton, 1982). According to the General Accounting Office, the
modernization program has been proceeding smoothly and the requirements, funding,
and design appear to be stable and sufficient to carry out a multi-year contract with
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little risk (GAO, 1987).
Special Operation Forces (SOF) A ircraft M odification;
In May of 1984 a joint Army and Air Force development initiative identified
the requirements and the responsibilities of the rotary wing Special Operation Forces
(SOF) operations. This was followed by a joint task force in October of the same
year that recommended the transfer of the entire SOF rotary wing mission from the
Air Force to the Army. This action was delayed by the Under Secretary of Defense
because of the lack of an adequate Army aircraft having the capabilities of the Air
Force’s HH-53 Pave Low helicopter. In 1986, the Army initiated a modification
program for CH-47 aircraft. Operationally, these modified aircraft, designated the
"MH-47", are expected to be able to perform clandestine, deep-penetration airlift
missions in adverse weather conditions and high-threat environments. Specific
missions include: counter-terrorism ac*^’cns, infiltration, resupply, extraction,
interdiction operations, civil affairs, and psychological operations.
In the beginning of the acquisition process, the Army decided that the modified
aircraft would be considered a non-developmental item and would require no
operational testing or developmental testing. In its 1989 statement of its SOF
helicopter acquisition strategy, the Army assumed that because the helicopters used in
the program were qualified systems, planned testing and evaluation would consist
primarily of integrating and testing already qualified components (GAO, 1990).
This philosophy changed as the limited testing of already qualified components
expanded to the complete testing of the entire aircraft system due to the expansion of

10
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and changes to the program. Currently, developmental testing is concurrent with the
low rate initial production of 22 of the SOF aircraft. This acquisition approach
includes a high risk testing strategy in which the Army would not conduct the required
operational tests before production decisions were made. The Army plans to have 53
of the 74 aircraft in production or delivered before the operational tests begin and 90
percent of the production aircraft completed or in production by the time the
operational testing is completed. In some cases the test aircraft will not have all the
operational equipment installed prior to the tests (GAO, 1990).
There have been multiple problems in the SOF aircraft program which resulted
in increased costs of over $302.6 million as of March of 1991. Of these costs,
Congressional budget cuts were approximately $48.4 million. Changes in the program
requiring extra effort, such as prototype testing requirements and an alternate cabin
arrangement, resulted in $97.3 million deficit of which $66 million additional funds
were provided. Cost increases in the Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE)
hardware and an outstanding claim from IBM resulted in an $53.6 million cost
impact. Benefits that were not received, such as the new T55-L714 engine
development and the auxiliary fuel tank qualification cost $19.5 million.
A development that impacted the program was the cancellation of the Army
purchase of the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. The costs associated with the
production and qualification of the Multi-Mode Radar (MMR) and the loss of the
development, tooling, co-production and software support resulted in over $84
million. All the costs that were to be absorbed in the production of the V-22 now had

11

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

to be absorbed into the SOF program.
The total cost of the program has expanded dramatically from $1.36 billion for
74 helicopters to an estimated cost of at least $2.1 billion. Most of these cost
increases are due to component and airframe costs that will be incurred are being
reported and paid for by other Army activities (GAO, 1990). The U.S. General
Accounting Office states that the Army will probably incur more cost to correct
problems identified during development and operational testing and to install
equipment that will not be available when the aircraft are fielded.
Although both acquisition programs dealt with the same basic airframe and are
within the same general time period, the differences were substantial. The CH-47 D
program has been considered to be always on time and within/under budget. The
SOF Aircraft program has had budgetary problems as well as difficulties in producing
the first prototype. In the comparison of the two programs, dissimilarities in the
contract types and the fundamental acquisition philosophies created problems with the
internal validity. However, the basic premise of a "good" program as delineated by
the Packard Commission should be evident in spite of these problems.

12
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VI. RESEARCH DESIGN

Qvestiomiairsx
A Likert scale questionnaire was selected as the most appropriate instrument
for accumulating data for this research project. After each question there was an area
that allowed for subjective comments, reproduced in Appendix B. There were two to
three questions for each of the six conditions for a successful acquisition as delineated
by the Packard Commission. These questions were systematically distributed
throughout the questionnaire to prevent the grouping of the topics. The questions
were randomly presented in either a positive or negative manner. This ensured that
the individuals would read each question and would not just go down the survey
answering all positively or negatively.
The survey questionnaire was prepared after a through review of literature on
the topic. The questions were designed to address each of the specific areas in an
acquisition model to emulate. Dr. Gerald Evans and Dr. Charles Smith reviewed the
questionnaire prior to the distribution. In addition, the questionnaire was pre-tested on
two military officers in order to determine the clarity of the questions and assess the
potential responses.
PQPtfktion.
The entire population consisted of the Program Managers for each of the two
acquisitions and their primary staff. Since the population was relatively small, there
was no need for sampling.

13
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Response rate.
A total of eight questionnaires were sent out. Two were sent to the Program
Managers and six to their primary staff. All were returned, resulting in a 100%
response rate.

14
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VII.

SURVEY RESULTS

The survey questionnaire and a tabulation of the results of each question are
included in Appendix A. The questions are identified by two numbers. The second is
the original number assigned when the questionnaire was sent out and the first number
realigns the questions into category groupings. The results of the questionnaire were
manipulated so that all the responses would be on the same scaling as to the phrasing.
The lowest score, one, indicates that the respondent was in total agreement with the
statement. In general, the higher the response value, the more in disagreement the
respondent is with the question, indicating a problem with the acquisition program.
This chapter presents the results of the survey questions as they relate to the six
conditions for a successful acquisition in the Packard Commission report.

C lear Command Channels:
In the Packard Commission’s report, the item of clear command channels were
explained as:
"A commercial program manager has clear responsibility for his
program, and a short unambiguous chain of command to his chief executive
office (CEO), group general manager, or some comparable decision maker.
Corporate interest groups, wishing to influence program actions, must persuade
the responsible program manager, who may accept or reject their proposals.
Major unresolved issues are referred to the CEO, who has clear authority to
resolve any conflicts. (Packard Commission, 1988)
Questions one through three were structured to measure the degree in which
the programs had this attribute. Question one addressed the short, unambiguous chain

15
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of command, question two addressed the clear responsibility issue, and question three
addressed the CEO’s authority. There was some confusion as to who the CEO was in
the two programs and so the third question was thrown out.
The quantitative data displayed in figure 3 appears to indicate that both

RESPONSE

COMMAND CHANNELS

4.5

Legend

4

CH-47D

3.5

SOF AIRCRAFT

3
2.5
2

1.5
1

0.5
0
#1 (1 )

#2(7)

#3(13)

ALL

QUESTION

Figure 3.

programs tend to be fairly equal in their responses. Although both acquisition
programs agreed with the questions, both tended to be neutral in their responses. The
qualitative comments revealed that there are problems in redundancy of reporting and
the transitions into the new Army management program.
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Stability:
The second underlying feature identified by the Packard Commission’s model
is stability. The commission describes stability as follows:
"At the outset of a commercial program, a program manager enters a
fundamental agreement or ’contract’ with his CEO on specifics of
performance, schedule, and cost. So long as a program manager lives by this
contract, his CEO provides strong management support throughout the life of
the program. This gives a program manager maximum incentive to make
realistic estimates, and maximum support in achieving them. In turn, a CEO
does not authorize full-scale development for a program until his board of
directors is solidly behind it, prepared to fund the program fully and let the
CEO run it with the agreed-to funding." (Packard Commission, 1988)

STABILITY

RESPONSE
6.5
6

Legend

5.5

CH-47D

5

SOF AIRCRAFT

4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2

1.5
1

0.5
#4(2)

#5 (8)

#6(14)

ALL

QUESTION

Figure 4.
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The was a large difference in the responses in this area (Figure 4). On
question four. This program has long term stability, and question five, This program
has unrealistic parameters on cost, scheduling and performance, the CH-47D program
responses agreed completely with the statements. As one respondent stated, "The CH47D modernization program has always been on schedule and cost". With the SOF
Aircraft procurement, the lack of stability seemed to be a major problem. One
response stated that "It is a credit to (the) Program Manager it (the program) stayed
on course at ail with the many program changes".

Lim ited Reporting RequLrements:
Limited reporting requirements is the third feature identified in the Packard
Commission model. The Commission’s meaning of limited reporting requirements is
as follows:
"A commercial program manager reports to his CEO. Typically, he
does so on a management-by-exception basis, focusing on deviations from
plan." (Packard Commission, 1986)
Reporting requirements seem to be a problem area for both the CH-47D and
the SOF aircraft programs. This area also prompted negative comments from both
programs. As stated by one respondent, "Many of the reoccurring reports convey
information which is 90-95% historical and (is) of no value as a management tool".
There was some confusion as to what "management by exception" meant. Because of
this, question eight was eliminated.

18
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REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
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#8(9)

ALL
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Figure 5.

Small, High Quality Staffs:
The fourth feature of the Packard Commission’s report is small, high quality
staffs. The commission describes these staffs as follows:
"Generally, commercial program management staffs are much smaller
than in typical defense programs, but personnel are hand selected by the
program manager and are of high quality. Program staff spend their time
managing the program, not selling or defending it. " (Packard Commission,
1986)
Over all, the CH-47D program seemed to be satisfied with the staffs that were
assigned to the program, however, the respondents thought that the staffing was too
small in relation to the program size. One respondent stated, "Major staff reductions

19
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STAFFING

RESPONSE
4.5

Legend
CH-47D
g

#9(4)

#1 0 (10)

#11 (14)

SOF AIRCRAFT

ALL

QUESTION

Figure 6.

in 1985 under ’matrix’ initiatives, but no corresponding work reduction". The
responses concerning the quality of the people working on both programs seem high.
A SOF Aircraft program respondent stated, "We have been very lucky with staffing.
The mission of the aircraft motivates many", and "A small, close and very functional
group with a wide variety of capabilities".

Com m unication with Users:
The fifth underlying feature defined by the Packard Commission was
communication with users. The Commission define communication with users as

20
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follows:
”A commercial program manager establishes a dialogue with the
customer, or user, at the conception of the program when the initial trade-offs
are made, and maintains that communication throughout the program.
Generally, when developmental problems arise, performance tradeoffs are
made — with the user’s concurrence — in order to protect cost and schedule.
As a result, a program manger is motivated to seek out and address problems,
rather than hide from them. " (Packard Commission, 1986)

COMMUNICATIONS WITH USERS
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Generally, both programs seem to be satisfied with the quality of
communication with the end user. The comments showed that the SOF aircraft
program had some difficulties with the end user leadership. One SOF program
respondent said, "User leadership is not always on line, but (the) lower levels have
direct real time involvement".
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Prototyping and Testing:
The last of the six underlying features that typified the most successful
commercial programs is prototyping and testing. The Commission described
prototyping and testing as follows:
"In commercial programs, a system (or critical subsystem) mvolving
unproven technology is realized in prototype hardware and tested under
simulated operational conditions before final design approval or authorization
for production. In many cases, a program manager establishes a red team, or
devil’s advocate, within the program office to workout pitfalls -- particularly
those that might arise from operational problems, or from an unexpected
response by a competitor. Prototyping, early operational testing, and red
teaming are used in concert for the timely idendfication and correction of
problems unforeseen at a program’s start." (Packard Commission, 1986)
There was a wide gap in the responses of the two programs. Almost all of the
responses of the CH-47D program were in total agreement as to quality and quantity
of the prototyping and testing of the program. The SOF program had problems
throughout with this issue. Comments from the SOF respondents were, "Prototypes
were built, however schedule and funding dictated concurrency with low rate initial
production", "Very limited testing. Production was blessed prior to completion of the
prototype" and, "Have prototypes, but also a very compressed schedule".

Statistical analysis:
In order to determine if the results of the questionnaire were statistically
significant. The Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for Independent Samples was performed on
each of the questions. The Wilcoxon test was chosen because the data scale was
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PROTOTYPING/TESTI NG
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3.5
3
2.5
2

1.5
1

0.5
#15(6)

#16 (12)

#17(17)

ALL

QUESTION
F ig u re

8.

ordinal and the problem objective was to compare two independent populations. The
null hypothesis was that the responses from the two programs were the same. The
alternative hypothesis was that the responses of the SOF aircraft program were
different then that of the CH-47D program. The significance level was set at alpha of
.10 (Keller, e ta l, 1990).
The results from the Wilcoxon test can be found in figure 7. The test revealed
that the responses to questions 4,5,15,16, and 17 were found to be statistically
significant. These questions related to two specific areas, stability and prototyping
and testing. Even though only responses to five questions were found to be
significant, almost all of the responses from The CH-47D program were lower than
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VI. SUMMARY
In 1986, when President Reagan established the Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management, he was looking in part for an answer to the acquisition
dilemma. The motivation was largely due to eroding Congressional and public
confidence in light of "overpriced spare parts, test deficiencies, and cost and schedule
over-runs" (Packard Commission, 1986). The Packard Commission, in a section
called "an acquisition model to emulate", identified six management features evident
in successful commercial programs. These features were based on the analysis of a
number of successful commercial programs. This paper has attempted to answer
whether those features are present in two current Army acquisition programs. One
acquisition, the Ch-47 D program, is generally considered a very successful program
and the second, the SOF aircraft program, has been plagued by problems in cost over
runs and program scheduling.
The survey identified two areas which were statistically significant in the
differentiation of the two acquisition programs; stability and the use of prototyping
and testing. Although the other areas addressed in the survey were relatively close in
their responses, the CH-47 D program was consistently more in agreement with the
Packard Commision Report than that of the SOF aircraft program. This consistency
of responses would tend to support the assumption that the areas identified in the
Packard Commission’s report are present in successful programs, even though the
responses to these questions were not statistically significant.
In the area of stability, there was a large divergence in the responses of the
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two programs. For the question "This program has long term stability", all
respondents from the CH-47 D model program stated they totally agreed with the
statement (average of I) while the SOF aircraft program respondents tended to be
neutral (average of 3.75). In response to the second stability question, "This program
has realistic parameters on cost, scheduling and performance", the CH-47 D program
respondents again totally agreed with the statement while the SOF program
respondents disagreed (average of 5). While the responses to the last question in the
area of stability, "Funding has not been a problem due to changes in the program",
were not statistically significant, there still was a wide gap in the responses in the two
programs. Most defense programs probably feel the pinch of funding problems and
relate them to changes in their program. As one CH-47D program respondent stated
"Lack o f funding is the root o f all evil”.
The responses by the SOF aircraft program in the area of stability are not
surprising due to the large numbers of changes in the program itself and the impact of
the loss of the V-22 Tilt-rotor program. The initial philosophy that the SOF program
would be non-developmental, and the urgency in which the aircraft were needed,
impacted dramatically on the long term stability of the program. Since the Air Force
was losing the special forces mission, the Department of the Defense planners were in
essence, trying to speed the developmental process. With the realization that the
requirements of the aircraft systems were expanding and the increased
risk involved in the process, there was going to be a need for
developmental and operational testing. This additional testing
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operational testing. This additional testing strained the long term stability of the SOF
program.
Stability has long been known as serious defense acquisition problem in both
the commercial and government sectors. In 1983, the Air Force Systems Command
investigated ways to shorten the acquisition process and procure weapons at a lower
cost. The study reviewed the cost and scheduling histories of 109 acquisition
programs and concluded that "program instability is the major causative factor o f cost
and schedule growth” (Air Force System Command, 1983). Frank Carlucci, former
Defense Secretary, once stated that "We all know what is fundamentalty wrong with
the acquisition system, time and again instability has been scored as its most chronic
defect” (F. C. Carlucci, 1988). David Packard, the head of the Presidents Blue
Ribbon Commission stated that "Without stability, no permanent acquisition
improvements are possible” (U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, 1986).
Prototyping and testing proved to be another area in which the programs were
significantly different. The first question in this area, "This system was proven using
prototyping of the hardware", showed that the CH-47 D program was in total
agreement with the statement while the SOF program tended to be more neutral in its
response. The next two questions dealt with testing the system’s design under
simulated operational conditions and the timely identification of problems using testing
and prototyping. Both questions showed a wide disparity between the two programs
in that the CH-47 D program responses were almost in total agreement with aU the
questions in this section, while the SOF Aircraft program responses were, on average,
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the highest for the entire questionnaire.
The questions on prototyping and testing prompted responses indicative of the
problems experienced by the SOF aircraft program. One respondent stated they had
"very limited testing. Production was blessed prior to completion o f the prototype. "
and ”Prototypes were built, however scheduling and funding dictated concurrency with
low rate production”.
The main problem with the SOF aircraft program is derived from the initial
thought that the SOF aircraft would be a non-developmental item and would require
no developmental or operational testing. Since the risk of the program was
determined to be large (GAO, 1990), the testing process was added after the
acquisition process had begun. The high risks that the General Accounting Office
identified as inherent to the SOF aircraft program included fielding systems requiring
expensive retrofits and providing aircraft that would be unable to perform their
required mission.
In this project, there were some limitations as to the internal validity of the
results. The two programs, although they both dealt with similar aircraft, were of
different contract types. The acquisitions were also different in respect to the
procurement time frame and the criticality of the mission aircraft. The surveyed
population was limited in size, but was substantial enough to perform the Wilcoxon
Rank Sum Test for Independent Samples. In light of these problems, there can be
drawn some valid conclusions concerning these two programs. First, the Packard
Commission’s six underlying features of a successful acquisition program are evident
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in what is generally considered as a timely, cost effective program. Secondly,
instability and the lack of prototyping and testing were major factors in the
degradation of the procurement process in the SOF aircraft program.
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APPENDIX A. Survey Questionnaire and results.
BACKGROUND INFORM ATION:
Title/Position ;____________________________________________________Yearaviththe
program;
Mil/Civ_____
QUESTIONNAIRE:
Please answer the question by indicating whether you agree or disagree by marking an
X along the scale. Provide any comments in the area provided.

1. This program has a short, unambiguous chain of command.
AGREE 1-----2-----3----- 4-----5----- 6 —7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:

2. This program has long term stability.
AGREE 1-----2-----3-----4-----5—
"—6 —7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:

3. There have been extensive reporting requirements.
AGREE 1-----2— “3—-—4——5-----6----- 7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:

4. The staffing for this program has been excessive.
AGREE 1-----2-----3----- 4----- 5----- 6-----7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:

5. The program staff has had poor communication with the end user.
AGREE I
2-----3----- 4-----5----- 6-----7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
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APPENDIX A. Survey Questionnaire and results.
6. The system was proven using prototyping of the hardware.
AGREE 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6—-—7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:

7. The Program Manager has clear responsibility for the program.
AGREE 1-----2-----3----- 4——5----6
7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:

8. This program has unrealistic parameters on cost, scheduling and performance.
AGREE 1—-—2——3----- 4---- 5-— 6---- 7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:

9. Reporting is accomplished by a "Management by exception principle.
AGREE 1-----2-----3----- 4-----5-----6----- 7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:

10. Personnel involved with this program are of the highest calibre.
AGREE 1——2-----3— -4----- 5-----6“~—7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:

11. All developmental problems and performance tradeoffs were made without the users’
concurrence.
AGREE 1-----2-----3----- 4-----5----- 6-----7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
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APPENDIX A. Survey Questionnaire and results.

12. The system’s design was tested under simulated operational conditions before final
design approval or production authorization.
AGREE 1-----2-----3----- 4-----5----- 6
7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:

13. The Chief Executives Office does not have clear authority to resolve any conflicts.
AGREE 1—~—2~— 3““ —4-----5----- 6-----7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:

14. Funding has been a problem due to changes in the program.
AGREE 1-----2-----3----- 4-- --5——^-——7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:

15. The program staff spends most of their time managing the program, not "selling of
defending" it.
AGREE 1—" 2 ““—-3——4—" 5 ““—6~~—7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:

16. Quality communication with the end user has been inconsistent throughout the
program.
AGREE 1 -2“~”"3~~—
" 4 ----- 5--~“~6””""7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:

17. Prototyping and operational testing were used together for timely identification and
correction of problems that were unforeseen at the programs start.
AGREE 1-----2-----3----- 4-----5----- 6----- 7 DISAGREE
NEUTRAL
COMMENTS:
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APPENDIX A. Survey Questionnaire and results.

Please answer the following questions:
A) What were the major accomplishments of the program?

b) What were the major problems with the program?

Thank you for your time and effort with this project. If you have any questions, please
contact me at (406) 251-2793

John M. Wilson
CPT, AV

SURVEY RESULTS:
SOF Aircraft Modification:
Original
Adjusted
Number
NuipbeJE
C lear Command Channels.
1
1
1
4
1
7
2
3
Stability.
0
13
3
0
2
2
4
5
7
8
5
6
Lim ited Reporting Requirements.
7
14
6
6
3
7
4
7
0
9
8
0
Small, High Quality Staffs.
4
9
1
7
10
10
2
1

Memgs
5
3

2
1

3
2

0
5
5

0
3
2

0
3.75
7.75

6
5
0

4
4
0

5.75
5
0

1
7

3
2

3
3
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APPENDIX A. Survey Questionnaire and results.
15
11
2
Communication with Users.
5
12
2
11
13
2
16
14
2
Prototyping and Testing.
6
15
12
16
17
17

3
3
6

D Modifications:
C lear Command Channels.
1
1
7
7
2
3
Stability.
13
3
0
2
4
1
8
5
1
Lim ited Reporting Requirements
14
6
1
3
7
4
9
8
0
Sm all, High Q uality Staffs.
4
9
1
10
10
3
15
11
1
Com m unication with Users.
5
12
2
11
13
4
16
14
2
Prototyping and Testing.
6
15
1
12
16
2
17
17
2

1

2

4

2.25

1
1
1

5
2
4

2
1
1

2.5
1.5
2

3
6
5

3
2
5

4
7
6

3.25
4.5
5.5

1
1

1
3

4
1

3.25
2

0
1
1

0
1
1

0
1
1

0
1
1

5
2
0

1
7
0

4
4
0

1.75
4.75
0

1
1
3

1
2
2

1
3
1

1
2.25
1.66

2
2
2

1
1
1

1
1
1

1.5
2
1.5

1
2
1

1
1
1

1
1
3

1
1.5
1.75
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APPENDIX B

Questionnaire comments.

The numbers in the parenthesis are the original order that they were asked. The
questions have been realign into the six areas as described by the Packard
Commission.
C lear Command Channels.
1.(1) This program has a short, unambiguous chain of command.
CH-47 D modification:
* The Logistic s division reports through both AVSCOM and PEO. At times
this redundant effort causes priority issues to be put on hold.
* Everyone is in charge and therefore no one is!
SOF Aircraft:
* Transition from the Army to SOCOM management has not been trouble free.
Army still wants a hand in management.
2.(7) The program manager has clear responsibility for the
program.
CH-47 D modification:
* AMC has not relinquished one iota of responsibility to PEO structure.
* Overall responsibility are clear. With regards to sustainment/readiness, we
are in a state of confusion.
SOF Aircraft:
* None
3.(13)

Thrown out.

Stability.
4.(2) This program has long term stability.
CH-47 D modification:
* The CH-47D modernization program has always been on schedule and cost.
* Attribute to multiyear procurement.
SOF Aircraft:
* Within a low density aircraft fleet.
* It is a credit to (the) PM it has stayed on course at all with the many
program changes.
5.(8) This program has unrealistic parameters on cost, scheduling and performance.
CH-47 D modification:
* The basic CH-47D program has realistic parameters.
SOF Aircraft:
* Had it been properly staffed from the start, the goals would have been more
realistic.
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APPENDIX B. Questionnaire Comments.
6.(14)

Funding has been a problem due to changes in the program.

CH-47 D modification:
* The basic program has remained stable. We have funding shortfalls mainly
due to ECP’s to better serve the user. We also have funding issue due to Operation
Desert Storm.
* All solvent programs experienced pressure to fund unprogrammed
requirements to support Desert Storm.
* Lack of funding is the root of all evil.
SOF Aircraft:
* No comments.
Lim ited Reporting Requirem ents.
7.(3) There have been extensive reporting requirements.
CH-47 D modification:
* Many of the recurring reports convey information which is 90-95% historical
and is of no value as a management tool.
* Many reports should be combined.
SOF Aircraft:
* SOCOM not sure yet what they want.
* There have been extensive historical/back briefings/
updating matrix support people.
8.(9) Thrown out.
Sm all, H igh Quality staffs.
9.(4) The staffing for this program is excessive.
CH-47 D modification:
* Overall program staffing has been adequate. We need authority to more (sic)
personnel as required due to program changes.
* Major staff reductions in 1985 under "matrix" initiatives, but no
corresponding work reductions.
* I have reduced staffing by 25% in four years.
SOF Aircraft:
* No comments.
10.(10) Personnel involved with this program is of the highest calibre.
ÇH-47 D modification:
* I believe persoimel involved with the CH-47D program is well above
average.
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APPENDIX B. Questionnaire Comments.
SOF Aircraft:
* We have been very lucky with staffing. The mission of the aircraft
motivates many.
* A small, close and very functional group with a wide variety of capabilities.
11.(15) The program staff spends most of their time managing the program, not
selling or defending it.
CH-47 D modification:
* The program sold itself.
SOF Aircraft:
* Lot of time spent selling and defending the program.
Com m unication W ith Users.
12.(50) The program staff has poor communication with the user.
CH-47 D modification:
* We have great communication with the user.
SOF Aircraft:
* User leadership is not always on line, but lower level has direct real time
involvement.
13.(11) All developmental problems and performance tradeoffs were made without
the users’ concurrence.
CH-47 D
* Those that affected the REC were coordinated.
* The user participated as a member of the CH-47D development team.
SOF Aircraft:
14.(16) Quality communication with the end user has been inconsistent throughout
the program.
CH-47 D modification:
* Strongly disagree.
SOF Aircraft:
* Good communication
Prototyping and Testing.
15.(6) This system was proven using prototyping of the hardware.
CH-47 D modification:
* Three prototype aircraft had full D.T./O.T. tests and demonstrated REC
requirements.
* Three prototypes tested for over three years plus accel. svs. life aircraft
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APPENDIX B. Questionnaire Comments.
tested for ten years during production.
SOF Aircraft:
* NDI off the shelf modifications with excessive integration.
* Have prototypes but also a very compressed schedule.
* Prototypes were built, however schedule and funding dictated concurrency
with low rate production.
16.(12) The system’s design was tested under simulated operational conditions before
final design approval or production authorization.
CH-47 D modification:
* Done as required.
SOF Aircraft:
* The modification package was considered "off the shelf" to an
existing/proven package.
* Very limited testing. Production was blessed prior to completion of the
prototype.
17.(17) Prototyping and operational testing were used together for timely
identification and correction of problems that were unforeseen at the programs start.
CH-47 D modification:
* The prototyping and operational tests were separate programs, however both
were used to identify and correct problems.
SOF Aircraft:
* Operational testing was part of the program based on MS O/I MARB.
M ajor accom plishm ents.
CH-47 D modification:
* Always below costs. Always within 60 days of schedule (off only during
groundings). It meets all requirements.
* Program has been executed within cost and schedule.
* The CH-47 modernization program is a total success. We are in the 10th
year of production and remain on schedule and cost. We have also successfully
fielded the active Army with 95% availability of ASL/PLL and special tools.
* On time, on cost, exceeding all technical and performance requirements
specified by the user.
SOF Aircraft:
* Provided unique aircraft for special operations. First truly integrated cockpit
for helicopters.
* In spite of funding and service fighting, the prototypes are flying.
* In spite of program dynamics and budget cuts we teve managed to keep the
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APPENDIX B. Questionnaire Comments.
program on track and viable. We are now actually on the verge of awarding
production contracts.
* Completion of prototypes, technical testing and obtaining a fully funded
program.

M ajor Problem s.
CH-47 D modification:
* Cost, ie, more system should have been modernized (cockpit,rotorhead, ect.)
but only so many dollars were available for development/production.
* During 1989, after the loss of an aircraft, a joint technical review team
recommended several improvements to the airframe and quality (on track an Boeing).
* Program delivery ends October 1993. This, plus other business base
reductions have caused a shift of key contractor personnel to commercial and higher
visibility military programs, result is reduced levels and timeliness of contractor
management support.
* Spares support at initial fielding and very large technical issues discovered
five years into production.

SOF Aircraft:
* Gain matrix, operational/technical tester support. Getting AAA to
understand the program.
* Having to live with all the problems a compressed schedule creates and die
reliance on benefits from other programs that did not materialize.
* Impacts of changes in the military industrial base. Contractors hidden
agendas and lack of urgency.
* Funding cuts and diversions.
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